ABSTRACT District-wide real-time information sharing provides new opportunities to optimize infrastructures and, for example, the energy consumption of smart cities. However, information collection introduces new privacy threats that must be addressed. Existing anonymization solutions are not sufficient for the brokering of streaming real-time measurements. Advanced adversaries may utilize information available from different sources and correlation analyses to reveal a measurement's actual source. We analyze security and privacy requirements and design a privacy-enhancing architecture for an information brokering platform. We propose an adaptive pseudonymization framework to make privacy attacks harder and to gain real-time awareness of the robustness of the privacy protection of platforms. Finally, we present an initial evaluation of the proposal using real-world energy consumption measurements.
I. INTRODUCTION
Homes, industrial and public buildings, city infrastructure, as well as energy distribution and production systems are becoming more and more connected. Emerging communication platforms enable different parties (residents, companies, commercial service providers, energy service operators, municipal authorities, and officials) to share energy information with analytics services to optimize district-wide energy efficiency. However, the sharing of detailed electricity and energy measurements introduces new kinds of privacy risks, as residents' daily routines and lifestyles can be inconspicuously profiled. For instance, individual home appliances and electric cars may be identified and their usage tracked [1] . District-wide collection of heterogeneous energy data exposes citizens even more to unsolicited information tracking, as attackers can produce more detailed profiles by combining data from various sources. Even privacy unconscious people may be worried about economic and political threats of unfair pricing and big brother surveillance [2] . Companies participating in information sharing are worried about the leakage of their business secrets and also about the correctness of data they use for their analyses. Consequently, platforms sharing energy information need secure brokering of privacy and business critical information.
In this paper, we propose a framework for enhancing privacy in a platform for real-time energy information sharing. Our proposal provides a lightweight mechanism for fine-grained access (privacy) control, end-to-end identification, and resistance against traffic analysis. The solution is based on anonymization (as in [3] ) where the identities of data sources are decoupled from shared data by replacing them with pseudonyms. To prevent advanced de-pseudonymization attacks that utilize correlated external observations and data similarity analysis, we re-pseudonymize data adaptively. The proposed solution tries to minimize the overhead of typical access control solutions and is, therefore, suitable for cases where large data streams are analyzed in real-time.
Our contributions include the following:
• Analyzing privacy and security threats in energy-aware smart cities -in particular, we focus on a realtime information sharing (publish-subscribe) platform, which is based on Future Internet softWARE (FIWARE) technology [5] .
• Proposing a novel framework for estimating the robustness of anonymity of real-time data streams, controlling the re-pseudonymization frequency, and enabling informed decision-making on the need for alternative secrecy mechanisms -the algorithms and design are based on observations that the robustness of FIGURE 1. Information sharing in the District of Future -project utilizes a cloud-based information brokering platform that collects data from city districts and provides them for analytic applications, which help to optimize energy usage.
anonymization depends on the life-time of pseudonyms, on the type and distinguishability of the data source, on the correlated events, as well as, on the number of similar data sources.
• Presenting an architecture for an information brokering platform -the architecture enables authenticated information sharing in a privacy-preserving manner.
• Evaluating the robustness of the adaptive pseudonymization approach against adversaries who relink measurements using correlated information -the evaluation is performed using real energy measurements gathered from a city district. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. First, in Section 2 we provide an overview of the information sharing platform and discuss the security and privacy requirements. Next, in Section 3 we propose a new framework for adaptive privacy management. Then, in Section 4 we present a possible attack against the proposed framework and use real energy information to analyze the robustness of the proposed privacy improvements. In Section 5 we elaborate on related work and, finally, in Section 6 we conclude the paper.
II. THE DISTRICT OF THE FUTURE
This section describes a use case and baseline technology for information and knowledge brokering in smart cities. We briefly summarize the actors, motivations, shared information, and central building blocks. We then present the current security architecture for controlling access to the brokering services and analyze the privacy and security needs that arise when the brokering platform is opened for large numbers of data providers and data users without complete trust of each other.
A. USE CASE DESCRIPTION
District of Future, DoF, is a European Commission funded project [4] that aims to improve the energy efficiency of smart cities. While similar projects often consider the energy efficiency of individual buildings, DoF takes it one step further and considers the energy efficiency of whole city districts.
The project has implemented an ICT platform, illustrated in Fig. 1 , for collecting several types of energy information from three use-case districts in three European cities (Corby in the UK, Orléans in France and Sabadell in Spain). This information is then used for energy modeling, with simulation tools used to find ways to optimize the energy behavior of each district in order to support the authorities and citizens in improving and optimizing energy efficiency.
Energy consumption and local generation data, as well as environmental monitoring data, are collected from several different kinds of facilities. The types of facilities include social housing, public buildings, e.g., libraries and schools, business facilities, offices, power plants, and weather stations. Facilities are further divided into spaces that contain installations that produce or consume energy, for example, gas boilers or air conditioners. Each installation may have a number of different parameters that are measured. These parameters include for instance energy consumption, energy production, occupancy, temperature, and pricing information.
It is envisioned that the platform will be open to various types of stakeholders, including data providers, information processing companies, data users, service providers, and other third parties. Data users might purchase information from data providers. Respectively, data providers may purchase data analysis services from third-parties that have registered with the platform. Thus, the envisioned platform forms a marketplace for energy-related information.
B. PLATFORM TECHNOLOGY
The DoF platform provides a set of essential services needed for the collection, storage, discovery, and querying of large amounts of real-time information, as well as the required security services. It is hosted in the cloud, thus allowing for scalability to a large number of city districts and for global availability for analysis of services utilizing information from several districts. The DoF platform infrastructure is based on an open architecture approach. It reutilizes generic enablers adopted or developed for the Future Internet Software VOLUME 4, 2016 FIGURE 2. Central components in access security for the DoF platform. FIWARE information sharing elements are illustrated in dark blue and security components in lighter blue. Data users are illustrated with red, data sources with yellow, and end-users with purple.
platform (FIWARE) under a European public-private partnership program [5] .
The data sources (e.g. sensors used to collect energy data from various systems) connect to the platform directly or through IoT-gateways that manage multiple data sources and perform the necessary protocol adaptation to seamlessly feed the platform. This is essential, as data sources form a heterogeneous group both in terms of collected data and the types of sensors used. Furthermore, the group is dynamic: new data sources may be introduced and old sources removed from the platform.
Information brokering in the platform is based on a publish-subscribe data model that follows the Next Generation Service Interface (NGSI) specifications [6] . The NGSI protocol enables the transmitting, storing, querying, and subscribing of real-time contextual information with arbitrary context attributes and metadata. NGSI information is shared through information brokers. In the DoF Platform, the Orion Context Broker Generic Enabler from FIWARE, is used.
The platform offers a set of core services for its users. Third-party users may utilize Complex Event Processing (CEP) components to capture real-time events and anomalies. The Hadoop-based Big Data component is provided for storing and processing historical data. For the endusers, Big Data and near real-time information is available through third-party DoF applications, as well as through a Data Export Service.
C. PLATFORM SECURITY
The baseline security architecture in the DoF platform provides the services needed to control access to the platform's external and internal interfaces. The architecture is based on the standardized security mechanisms and protocols that are available in the FIWARE platform [5] : confidentiality and integrity of the communication is based on the use of HTTPS, authentication is based on the OAuth [7] framework and proxies in front of platform services, and access control is enabled with an XACML policy server. The central components and security interactions in the DoF security architecture are illustrated in Fig. 2 .
Data user and data source identities are managed using an OAuth-based Identity Manager (FIWARE KeyRock). Users and sources are authenticated when they connect to the platform by the security proxy, enforcing platform access control. In a basic setup, end-to-end identification is not provided. This is suitable for a case where all data sources are trusted and can themselves add identification information to the NGSI context messages they transmit through the broker. In a setup where data sources are not trusted, alternative end-to-end identification mechanisms are needed.
The context broker mediates context information for every subscribing data user, who is trusted by the DoF platform. The broker does not enforce fine-grained access control on who can subscribe to which data source. Implementing a finegrained access control to the broker is possible, but it would require complex policy management and cause additional overhead for every mediated NGSI message. Data sources can apply application-specific encryption mechanisms to protect their data and identities against unauthorized access as well as misbehaving platform components. However, encryption does not hide communication frequencies when a particular source updates a particular context entity.
Access control services provided in FIWARE include interface-level protection (based on HTTPS and OAuth) as well as information and application-specific controls via an XACML-based policy server (FIWARE AuthZForce). Access control can be enforced in services or in a reverseproxy (e.g. FIWARE Wilma) located at the front of the services. The services (or proxy) will query the Identity Manager for user identification and the policy server for authorization decisions to access particular information. The policy server should be available only for trusted platform services, as the policy decisions themselves may leak data information. In the current AuthZForce implementation, the access control over 916 VOLUME 4, 2016 authorization decisions is not tied to information-specific access control policies -a user with authorization to get one policy decision has an authorization to query decisions on every policy.
The DoF platform will be open to third-parties like energy analytic service providers. Trust between data providers and third-party services must be created using means that are external to the platform. However, as all data providers may not trust all data users and may not wish to disclose information to everyone, additional fine-grained security mechanisms (see Section III) are needed to control information brokering.
D. PRIVACY ISSUES
Even though individuals living in and using the buildings from which the energy information is collected are not directly monitored, the collected information may violate their privacy. Energy consumption information could be used for criminal purposes (e.g., by burglars), but also for unauthorized profiling and tracking (e.g., for marketing purposes), or even by authorities (e.g., to perform surveillance or criminal investigation without warrants) [8] . The collected parameters, such as energy consumption, hot water consumption, and ventilation data, can for instance indicate if a person is at home or not, or if she is sleeping or cooking.
The granularity of any collected information and the frequency of measurements will affect how revealing the information is. Fine-grained high-frequency consumption information might allow tracking of individuals' behaviors and daily routines. Furthermore, fine-grained information may be used in inventory attacks [9] to reveal the set of appliances that an individual owns. The party violating privacy may be a legitimate user of the collected data rather than a malicious outsider. Furthermore, the ubiquitous, continuous, and passive nature of the data collection increases privacy risks, as individuals become less aware of being monitored.
A trust model where all authorized parties are equally trusted and have equal access to the collected information is unrealistic in an open system. First, there can be various kinds of data users, some of whom are more trustworthy than others. Second, the nature of monitored buildings, and thus, related privacy concerns may differ considerably. For example, privacy requirements for information collected from a public library are quite different than those for information collected from an individual's home. Third, the perceived level of privacy, as well as the level of trust for other actors depends strongly on each individual's personal preferences. This also means that individuals' willingness to hand over their data for some specific use or data user might vary. Consequently, one-size-fits-all solutions are inadequate.
Identification, i.e., the act of associating an individual's data with that individual's identifier, is the enabler for privacy violations. Anonymization, i.e., the process of removing all attributes and characteristics allowing identification, is one approach to protect sensitive information. However, anonymization is not trivial: data available from other sources may be used in de-anonymization. It might even be possible to infer information that the individual did not disclose to the system in the first place. The dynamicity of the DoF platform further complicates the matter, as assessing the level of anonymity provided becomes harder.
For instance, an adversary may utilize the following information to reveal a data source's identity:
• Cross correlation of physical phenomena. For instance, energy consumption by air conditioning and room temperature often change in tandem.
• Physical phenomena are not discrete. Measured values are usually somewhat predictable based on the previous values, especially in relatively short measuring intervals.
• Behavior of the parameters depends on the surrounding environmental conditions, such as weather, time of day and time of year. Thus, measurements from the same area tend to behave similarly.
• Behavior of parameters depends on the people using the buildings. People tend to have certain schedules and daily routines, e.g. they go to work at roughly the same time each day, which is in turn reflected in the measured values.
• Different sensors behave differently. For example, sensors from different manufacturers may produce a different set of error values. Thus, collected energy information is expected to be somewhat periodic and predictable based on the history.
The need for privacy must be balanced with the utility of the data. In order to be useful for the intended purpose, the collected information must be detailed enough. To optimize energy consumption and generation, it must be known how the energy is actually used. In addition, to model and simulate the energy behavior of a whole city district, participation in the system must be comprehensive enough. Thus, it is beneficial for the whole system to encourage building users and owners to contribute their data to the platform. This can be achieved by increasing the motivation, e.g., by offering savings in energy bills or direct payments for the data, but it is also important to minimize the privacy risks related to participation.
The principle of informational self-determination is an ideal basis for privacy. It states that each individual should have the ability to determine disclosure and the use of her personal information. Ziegeldorf et al. [9] consider what such a notion of privacy means in the context of the Internet of Things. Their requirements consist of three things: 1) guarantee to the individual of awareness of privacy risks caused by surrounding smart things and services, 2) the individual's control over the collection and processing of her personal information by these, as well as, 3) awareness and control of subsequent use of the information outside of the individual's immediate control. In other words, the individual should be able to assess the involved risks, to take appropriate actions to protect her privacy, and be assured that these are enforced also outside of her immediate control.
None of these requirements can be addressed on the platform and technology level alone, but the platform can VOLUME 4, 2016 facilitate achieving them. Coarse-grained access control, where end-users may be able to choose the installed meters or opt out of the collection altogether is not enough. Effectively it is all-or-nothing. Once their information enters the platform, control and visibility over it is lost. Instead, the platform should provide fine-grained access control to enable flexible security and privacy controls. This is a key requirement for increasing an individual's control over her sensitive information.
III. PRIVACY MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
This section presents and analyses our evolution proposals for secure, efficient, and privacy-enhanced sharing of information across the DoF platform. Essentially, we focus on end-to-end privacy-preserving identification and finegrained access control by pseudonymization of real-time data streams. The framework supports a trust model where the essential platform components are assumed to be reliable, but where the parties trust only some of the other parties and only partially. We study costs, benefits, and the application of proposed mechanisms in the brokered architecture, where information flows from publishing data sources to subscribing data users through the context broker.
A. DECOUPLING DATA AND ITS MEANING
Our proposal is based on the observation that individual measurements (single data values) are not privacy or business critical without their context, e.g., identity and location of a source. In our proposal, we decouple measurements from their context and then provide recoupling information only for authorized parties. The proposed mechanism is essentially a very cheap mechanism providing confidentiality and access control: the data itself does not need to be confidential as long as the adversary does not know what the information means. Additionally, the approach prevents monitoring of data sources' activity, as unauthorized users cannot follow when a particular source publishes data.
In the DoF project, each installation is represented as its own context entity, while context attributes represent measured parameters, i.e., values provided by individual data sources. Metadata for each context attribute include, e.g., a tag identifying the parameter, a human readable description of the parameter, and a timestamp indicating when the measurement was performed. Data sources provide measurements at certain intervals, e.g. every 15 minutes, and transmit the measured values to the energy information platform in the NGSI format. Data sources are identified using a naming scheme, which contains the full name hierarchy, from the name of the measurement to the building or facility and to the locating city. Context entity names can be used to recognize installations that are somehow related, e.g., are in the same building.
Our privacy-enabling data model proposal breaks information describing a single data source into several pieces of information represented with several NGSI context elements as described in Fig 3 . The types of context elements are as follows: 1) Discovery context contains public, high-level, lowsensitivity description of the data source available to all authorized data users and is used to discover information. For example, data users may search for suitable information based on general locations of data sources published in discovery contexts. Information on the number of data sources under the discovery context is available for everyone (though the actual measurements will not be). 2) Data source context represents one measured parameter or phenomenon. For example, one location or one device producing several distinct measurements is represented as several data source contexts. The data source context has an important function in the data model: it acts as a reference point, or a handle, to other information about the data source. 3) Meta context contains more detailed or sensitive information on data source, e.g. the detailed location of the data source, the unit of the measured value, device manufacturer information, or the owner's identity. There may be several meta contexts for each data source. Each meta context is identified using its own identifier, which is random and cannot be linked to other contexts. 4) Profile context contains information that characterizes the measurements provided by the data source. Several data sources with similar measurements share a profile. There may be contexts, for instance, for outdoor temperature, home electricity consumption, as well as office hot-water consumption. The robustness of anonymity can be estimated by counting the data sources with the same profile context: the more sources, the more robustness. New data sources are profiled when they are introduced to the platform. 5) Measurement context contains the actual measured data value from the data source and a time stamp, 918 VOLUME 4, 2016
i.e. only the values that may change for each measurement. Measurement contexts are identified using pseudonyms, which are random and unlinkable to the data source. A data user can link measurements only to those data source contexts that the data provider authorizes. 6) Data provider context defines the provider of the data source. The context provides information on the means to acquire authorization to access the data source. The proposed data model allows data providers to control their privacy -to provide information of different granularity to different data users. Fine-grained control is provided by publishing only coarse-grained information and then authorizing a data user to acquire only some contexts with more detailed information (as explained in Section III.C). For instance, a data source may reveal its location only at district level (by publishing a relation to a particular district discovery context), but the exact street address may be revealed only for authorized parties (by authorizing the data user to find related meta contexts). Sensitive information can also be distributed into several meta contexts, each describing only one aspect of the data source. The decision on what information is published in the contexts and how the data source's information is partitioned between discovery and meta contexts is data-source dependent and is a trade-off between utility and privacy.
In addition to the measurement contexts representing the real measured parameters, data sources can publish measurements that contain less sensitive aggregate values of higher granularity. For example, a data source could provide the whole energy consumption of all individual measurements and provide less trusted data users only with this context's pseudonym identifier(s) instead of identifiers for each individual parameter.
The proposed approach is suitable for fine-grained numerical data such as individual energy measurements. The payload data provided in individual measurement contexts should not have any contextual information within itself that could be used to link related contexts with each other. Thus, the approach is not suitable for real-time brokering of structured information, such as chat messages. In addition, our proposal only considers read access to the data. Write access must still be controlled by other means.
B. ADAPTIVE PSEUDONYM MANAGEMENT
The proposed data model is a compromise between the discoverability of data sources, the granularity of privacy control, the robustness of anonymity, as well as performance overhead due to management operations. The relationships between these trade-offs are illustrated in Fig 4. The model illustrates the adaptation possibilities in the DoF platform and how the amount of published information, correlated data sources, and pseudonymization frequency affects trade-offs between different objectives. The figure also illustrates how the privacy inference functionality that is provided by the platform is tied to the system. The approach assumes that there are enough data sources that are behaving similarly to make it difficult to distinguish one data source from others and to link pseudonyms to real identities using the collected data itself. Linking individual measured values might still be possible for those measured values that are clearly distinguishable from other values, e.g. because of the magnitude of the value or anomalies. For example, if there is only one factory in a district, its energy consumption is very likely to stand out from that of apartments or warehouses.
When a new data source is added to the platform, the data provider must be aware of how strongly it will be protected and whether alternative mechanisms like encryption are required. The platform knows the number of data sources with a particular profile and can therefore provide this information for data providers introducing new data sources. The number of data sources with a similar profile is an initial estimate of the robustness, of when these sources can be assumed to provide similar, indistinguishable measurements. Furthermore, the platform could also analyze previous measurement sets to provide better estimates of how easily particular measurements can be distinguished from others.
1) ROBUSTNESS OF ANONYMITY
Pseudonymization by itself is not enough to provide strong privacy in a dynamic system, as pseudonyms could be tracked to a real identity where sufficient data is available. This is because pseudonym identifiers link consecutive measurements in time. The time dimension makes it much easier to deduce the mapping based on correlated external data.
To strengthen the robustness of anonymity, a pseudonym's lifetime must be limited and pseudonyms must be changed frequently enough. Furthermore, pseudonyms must be changed in larger groups or it will be trivial to deduce the mapping by following pseudonym lifetimes. Thus, we re-pseudonymize all data sources with similar profiles at the same time. The re-pseudonymization frequency is a trade-off between the robustness level and efficiency, as the re-pseudonymization operation incurs a performance penalty and disturbs the utility of the platform. VOLUME 4, 2016
2) DE-PSEUDONYMIZATION BY MEASUREMENT SIMILARITY
The privacy protection of this proposal is based on the indistinguishability of the pseudonymized data from real identities, and on keeping the linking information behind an authorization mechanism. An adversary who collects all shared information (or information with a common public profile) may try to recouple the identity to the measurements. A naïve approach for recoupling is guessing, with a probability of 1/K, where K is the number of data sources. An advanced adversary may utilize previously revealed measurements (whose source identity may have been bought or been inferred by detecting an anomaly) from a single time period to relink the identity to pseudo-identifiers from other time periods. Measurement sets from the same data source may be similar (i.e. temporally correlated) even if they are from different time periods and thus linkable to each other. In other words, a measurement set can be used -as an 'identification vector' -to find close matches from other measurement sets and thus to increase the adversary's probability to link an identity to a pseudo-identity correctly. The nonlinkability of pseudo-identifiers and the potential linkability of similar measurement sets are illustrated in Fig. 5 . The strength of anonymity of a measurement set depends on the number of other measurements sets that are similar to the set. We measure the similarity between identified and pseudonymized measurement sets (of length 'm') with Euclidean distance:
There may be some environmental reasons why the values in different time periods may change. Also, some measurements are quite cyclical in the sense that the measurements follow the same pattern each day, or for each week. For instance, all houses may increase energy consumption when the weather becomes colder, while each house may have lower indoor temperature at nights. To compensate for environmental and calendar-phase differences, an adversary may make some adjustments to her reference values by looking at the change in the average value when comparing a revealed time period and a studied time period. The compensation algorithm is as follows (where 'k' is the amount of data sources):
The adversary may further improve the attack by focusing on the pseudonym-discontinuation points (i.e. the moment of time when the pseudonym changes). The adversary may assume that the measurements will remain similar and that possible increasing or decreasing trends will continue. Consequently, the adversary can link measurements sets where the first measurements of one data source are close to the last measurements of another source. We use spline interpolation and extrapolation functions as well as standard deviation SD to estimate whether two data sets are continuous.
Continuous(M[time][ID], M[time-1][pseudoID])
The adversary can use the algorithm presented in Fig. 6 to find the best matching pseudo-id for each time period.
3) RE-PSEUDONYMIZATION FREQUENCY
The re-pseudonymization frequency can be adjusted automatically by evaluating the easiness of de-pseudonymization. The algorithm, presented in Fig. 7 evaluates the de-pseudonymization likelihood using the metrics presented in Subsection III.B.2, iteratively decreasing the amount of samples each time with one pseudonym. The algorithm stops when the average hit rate for the last few rounds is below the desired threshold. If the desired hit rate is not found when the period length for the same pseudonyms becomes one, the desired robustness level cannot be provided.
The algorithm is used in the platform to identify easily distinguishable data sources i.e. sources that are correctly de-pseudonymized for several time periods. It analyses the similarity of identified reference measurements and unidentified measurements. The algorithm does not consider de-pseudonymization attacks that utilize correlated information. Hence, the algorithm can be used to find the upperbound for the robustness of anonymization and an initial estimate for the minimal re-pseudonymization frequency.
4) EVENT-TRIGGERED RE-PSEUDONYMIZATION
Measurements may become identifiable due to events that correlate with the pseudonymized measurements and which are known to the adversary. There are different types of events that can trigger re-pseudonymization in the platform. First, events that cause significant short-time changes to the measurement can be detected from the data as anomalies. For instance, a power outage or a malfunctioning device may be detected as some periodic measurement values that are missing or the values are not within the thresholds of normal values. Second, as new data sources can be added or old sources removed from the system, or ownership of a data source may change, the indistinguishability of information may change. The platform may therefore dynamically initiate re-pseudonymization to increase the robustness. Third, re-pseudonymization of a measurement stream will trigger a re-pseudonymization on correlated streams.
Re-pseudonymization also has another function in the system. Since fine-grained access control is based on knowledge of the relationship between data sources and pseudonym identifiers, pseudonym changes can be used to revoke data user's permission to access new data from the same source. Similarly, pseudonyms can be used to provide access to historic data stored in the data storage service.
C. PRIVACY ENHANCING ARCHITECTURE
In order to support the privacy-enhancing end-to-end identification and access control mechanism proposed in the previous sections, the platform must pseudonymize information and provide a de-pseudonymization service that enables data users to map pseudonyms to a data source. Data providers must have the means to authorize or deny data users receipt of this information. We propose a reverse proxy-based approach, hence called the Identity Mediator, to support such interaction. The main phases of identity mediation (illustrated in Fig. 8 ) are as follows:
1) Data source authentication -The Identity Mediator in front of the broker authenticates the data source and acquires the data source's identity from the Identity Manager using HTTPS and OAuth protocols. The proposal assumes that each data source has an account in the Identity Manager and can be authenticated individually. The mediator learns the source's identity and the data source's optional contact URL, which can be used later to authorize identity requests. 2) Source registering and discovery -New data sources are added to the platform by registering discovery and data contexts to the context broker. Data users can find suitable discovery contexts by querying the context broker.
3) Measurement pseudonymization -The Identity
Mediator embeds a pseudonym identifier into each pseudonymized context entity in each measurement (measurement context update) coming from an authenticated data source.
4) Data user authentication -The Identity Mediator
authenticates the data user using the Identity Manager with HTTPS and OAuth protocols. The Identity Manager provides the data user's identity and contact URL. 5) Mediated identity request -A data user wishing to resolve either a pseudonym identifier related to some data source context (in order to be able to subscribe to the correct measurements context) or identify a data source from a particular pseudonym must request this information from the Identity Mediator. The mediator forwards identification requests only for actual data providers and, thus, prevents adversaries from learning which data users are using which data sources. The mediator forwards requests to data providers using the data sources' contact URL, which is available from the Identity Manager. Sources that do not provide an online service for delivering an identity request must poll the mediator or must have provided an authorization policy for the mediator. The mediated request includes the data user's identity, the time period for which the requested identity information is needed, and the contact URL for direct negotiations. 6) Payments and trust building -Optionally, the data provider may use the data user's contact URL to initiate direct negotiations for terms of authorization. This phase is used to support the information marketplace concept by enabling direct interaction between the data provider and data user. Direct interaction can be used for trading information, for buying of analysis services, and for trust building. This direct interaction involves authentication of the data provider for the data user using the OAuth protocol as well as interactions with different external payment services (not described in the figure). 7) Mediated identity delivery -If the data provider decides to authorize the data user to acquire the requested identity information or any part of it, it decides which pseudonyms or identifiers will be disclosed and provides this information to the Identity Mediator. 8) Re-pseudonymization -At certain intervals, a pseudonym change triggers generation of a new pseudo identifier and its synchronization with the authorized data users. A new context element is created to represent the measurement. Each interested user needs to subscribe to the new context. Optionally, the data processing rules of any platform services, e.g., CEP, need to be updated to reflect the new pseudo-identities. As result of the data model proposed in Section III.A, subscription to interesting measurements becomes a three phase process. First, a data user searches the discovery contexts to find suitable data sources. The search could be based, e.g., on location (city, district, and building). Then, the data user requests pseudonym identifiers to the related meta and/or measurement contexts from the Identity Mediator, using the identifier of the data source context. If authorized to request the information, the data user can next query for related meta contexts in order to gain more information about the data source or it can directly subscribe to the data source's measurement context and start receiving notifications on measured values.
The architecture is efficient as the proposed authorization by de-pseudonymization is a one-time operation. It does not mandate authorization checks every time information is queried or delivered (as in many access control systems) or heavy computing (as in cryptography). Consequently, it may be used when handling large scale data streams, e.g., when aggregating information or detecting combinations of events using complex event processors.
The Identity Mediator can be deployed relatively easily as a reverse-proxy, which in addition provides an identity request service. The service interface and the proxy can be wrappedup as a (FIWARE) generic enabler and, hence, reused. Furthermore, the architecture does not demand any security or privacy services from the context broker. Hence, the approach may be used with any legacy context broker. Once a data user knows which contexts (pseudonym identifiers) are needed for the desired information, NGSI operations used with the context broker are exactly the same as those used without the proxy. Security reasoning components, which trigger re-pseudonymization, can be implemented as data users.
D. SUPPLEMENTARY SECURITY AND PRIVACY MECHANISMS
The proposed access control mechanism does not guarantee privacy for all purposes or all data sources. Data from data sources that are highly sensitive or easily distinguishable from the others should be encrypted. Encryption prevents the de-pseudonymization attacks that were presented in Subsection III.B.2). However, encryption punishes the system performance and also makes utilization of data harder, as the decryption keys must be provided to the data users, such as complex event processors and analytic services. However, the same mechanisms that are used for pseudonym identifier management may be used also for the management of encryption keys.
The encryption algorithm should be optimal for protecting the measurement values, which are short and may repeat frequently. Consequently, the algorithm should be nondeterministic (e.g. a unique nonce should be used) to ensure that each encryption of the same measurement value will yield a different ciphertext.
In addition to the protection of the measurements, it is possible to encrypt identity information in discovery or meta contexts and thus prevent e.g. inventory attacks. However, such protections will make it difficult to search for information from the platform. To enable the lookup of data sources (by trusted parties with secret keys), identity information can be encrypted with a deterministic encryption algorithm. Each identity information block should contain a unique identifier to prevent the same data being encrypted several times with the same key.
Pseudonymization is necessary even if the data is encrypted to prevent traffic analysis and denial of service attacks. It prevents adversaries from observing the update frequencies of particular context elements. Even if the adversary would not be able to observe the content, the changes could in some cases indicate activity and data users' presence in particular locations. Pseudonymization provides availability protection against targeted attacks where an adversary injects DoS traffic against a particular context.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we analyze the proposed pseudonymization framework in light of real energy information. First we describe the dataset collected in the DoF project. Then we visualize the temporal correlation between the selected parameters. Finally, we evaluate the robustness of the adaptive pseudonymization approach. In the robustness analysis, we assume an attack model where the adversary knows the identity for one measurement set and tries to identify related sets by calculating the similarity and guessing the most similar as described in Subsection III.B.
The de-pseudonymization algorithm, calculating statistics from the dataset, has been implemented as a python script.
A. DoF DATASET
The dataset we have used for our analysis contains actual energy data gathered from 31 social housing apartments located in the Sabadell City Area in Spain. These data sources were selected as they were the largest set of similar data sources in our data. Our sample consists of measurements over a four-week period with a measurement frequency of 15 minutes, giving a total of 2688 measurements per apartment. Two parameters used as examples in this paper are the total electricity consumption of an apartment (kWh) and the apartment's indoor temperature ( • C).
The dataset is not error-free. First, there are some clearly erroneous measured values. For total electricity consumption the amount of such values is negligible, but for indoor temperature all values measured in five apartments are clearly error values produced by the sensors. From our perspective these values are still measured values that represent the behavior of the sensor and might be used to distinguish certain sensors. Second, a small number of measurement values are missing. The number of missing values of all the measured values for the total electricity consumption and the indoor temperature are 3.02% and 0.75%, respectively. For both the parameters, the missing values are distributed somewhat evenly among the apartments.
B. TEMPORAL CORRELATION IN ENERGY MEASUREMENTS
The behavior of the example parameters -the electricity consumption and indoor temperature -are illustrated in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 . Both the figures depict measurements from two apartments across three different days. The behavior of each parameter is approximated with a Bezier curve plotted using the measured data points with 15-minute intervals. Measurements from different apartments are denoted using green and red colors. Different shades of green and red are used to distinguish curves representing measurements from different days. Selected days correspond to the same day of the week (Saturday) for the first three weeks of the data set.
Even though these figures only illustrate a very small sample, they seem to give some support to our assumptions on the behavior of the data. For the electricity consumption data, the curves representing the same apartment tend to be close to each other and there are several peaks that recur in curves of the same color. For indoor temperature the curves resemble each other more closely. This was already expected, as the temperature depends on the night and day cycle. A drastic fall in indoor temperature between 9 am and 5 pm in two of the curves correspond to missing measurement values, and thus, represent an anomaly (which could trigger a re-pseudonymization in the platform).
C. EASINESS OF DE-PSEUDONYMIZATION VIA TEMPORAL CORRELATION
The adversary can link a (revealed) measurement set to other measurements from the same data source with a certain probability. The maximal robustness against linking attacks is inversely proportional to the number of measurements: If measurements are random, the attacker can guess correctly with a probability of 3.2% (1/31). When the attacker utilizes temporal correlation (i.e. algorithm presented in Subsection III.B), his probabilities increase. Fig. 11 illustrates the success likelihoods in temporal correlation attacks against indoor temperature and electricity consumption measurements. The figure illustrates how the attacks hitrate (i.e. a ratio between successful pseudonymizations against the number of unknown measurement sets) changes when the measurement type changes. The figure indicates that indoor temperature measurements are more easily distinguishable than electricity consumption measurements. The average hitrate (for pseudoperiods between 15 minutes to one week) is 14.19% is for indoor temperature and 3.77% for electricity consumption. Consequently, attackers depseudonymizing electricity consumption data do not benefit significantly from the correlation attack.
The figure also illustrates some, though small, dependency between the hitrate and the life-time of pseudonyms in the case of temperature: the longer the same pseudo-identifier is used, the easier it is to de-pseudonymize.
The measurements are cyclical; the values follow the daily and weekly routines of the residents as well as the day and night cycle. The environmental correction proposed in Subsection III.B compensates for the average changes due to the day and night cycle and thus increases an adversary's accuracy significantly. The average hit rate for de-pseudonymizing temperature measurements was 14.19% with the correction and 3.77% without it. The difference is explained by the cyclical nature of temperature. Absolute measurements taken at one period of a particular day are not likely to match measurements taken at different time on some other day. The environmental correction enables us to make relative comparisons that will yield more accurate guesses.
However, each house has its own daily phase and profile which will cause daily peak values. Hence, the hit rate is highest when the reference vector is compared to the values for the same time of day (in the figure, period length for one day is 96, as measurements are updated every 15 minutes). As the attacker may be assumed to be able to make the phase corrections the peak values are the most meaningful when evaluating the robustness of the scheme.
The discontinuity-filtering technique proposed also in Subsection III.B did not yield noticeable benefits for the attacker. The advantages gained with discontinuity analysis are small when the total studied time period contains several pseudonym periods, as the discontinuity can be checked only for the period that is closest to the reference values.
In Fig. 11 , the depseudonymization hitrate increases only slightly as the pseudonym life-time increases. The presented algorithm always tries to correlate the entire block of data identified by a pseudonym to the rest of the data. However, the attacker could also base the attack on using only part of the data series consisting of the most distinguishable features of the data. Longer pseudonym life-time allows more space for such approaches. Thus, we believe that for more advanced correlation algorithms, the hitrate will increase more rapidly as the pseudonym life-time increases. . They provide cloud services for collecting measurements from smart meters. The security requirements for these platforms involved simply restricting access for security and control, as the information was not necessarily meant to be shared with various (potentially untrusted) parties.
V. RELATED WORK
Fine-grained authorizations over shared energy information has been addressed e.g. by Singh et al. [10] . They emphasized the need for access control over fine-grained information as well as the time-dimension and proposed privacy-specific controls such as k-anonymity by obfuscation, noise, and homomorphic cryptography. Lahoti et al. [11] proposed the generalization of data shared with third-parties while retaining authenticity by using Merkle hash trees. Mashima and Roy [12] enhanced the privacy of the idea by adding noise and using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. The downsides of the proposals, when compared to our framework, include inaccuracy due to loss of generalized information, as well as processing costs due to the use of cryptographic constructs and additional noise.
Cryptography-based protection for sharing home-specific information through the cloud has been presented e.g. by Gupta et al. [13] . They focused on simplifying the management of protection by keeping data in small encrypted chunks and distributing keys on explicit authorization using a meta server. The importance of platform internal security mechanisms was emphasized by Henze et al. [14] who proposed an end-to-end security architecture consisting of transport security (from an information source to a cloud entry point) and object security (from the entry point to a user). The downsides of purely cryptography-based approaches include processing costs, as well as the complexity of policy and key management.
Privacy of energy data collection has also been studied in the context of smart grids [8] . In many smart grid privacyrelated research papers, the considered use case system is less open compared to the DoF energy information market place approach, and related research papers usually concentrate on energy consumer's privacy from the electric supplier perspective. A common research question concerns minimizing sensitive information that is collected and transmitted to the electric supplier, while still allowing important business functionality, e.g., grid management, billing, and fraud detection. For example, Bohli et al. [15] note that even though smart meters allow fine-grained information to be collected in high frequency, such information, e.g., on the current energy consumption of each individual customer, is not actually needed for basic smart grid functionality. Instead, many of these functions can be performed using aggregated measurements over groups of smart meters [16] . The DoF platform could also provide aggregated measurements, e.g., in space, time, or by type of data source, to increase privacy while still retaining some level of usefulness in the case of less trusted data users.
B. REAL-TIME ANONYMITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
There is a huge body of work that considers privacypreserving data-publishing [17] , i.e., methods and tools for sharing sensitive information, e.g. for research purposes. The key issue is the trade-off between the privacy aspects of the individuals that the data might describe and the utility of the information for analytical purposes. Anonymization techniques are an integral part of this work. Different anonymity metrics have been developed for presenting the requirements for the anonymity of data. The k-anonymity metric [18] requires that an equivalence class -a set of data items that are indistinguishable from other data items with respect to identifier attributes -must contain at least k items. The t-closeness [19] and (n-t)-closeness [20] metrics require that the distribution of sensitive attributes that are linkable to each other is close to the distribution of the attribute in the overall table (or within n other equivalence classes). The strength of anonymity can also be described with re-identification probabilities [21] , [22] , as well as with entropy-based information leakage metrics [23] . The focus of the privacy metrics such as K-anonymity has been on the dataset for anonymity without any particular focus on the time dimension, which is essential when considering energy data and measurements. Most of the work on privacy metrics considers static data sets where all the data is available at the release time of the anonymized data set. More dynamic metrics that consider re-publication of data sets that at least partially represent the same data with possible updates and deletions, e.g. m-invariance [24] , also exist. These metrics aim to maintain a level of privacy in cases where an attacker could compare two or more different releases. However, none of the anonymity metrics discussed above are directly designed for real-time publish-subscribe systems.
Work focusing on managing the privacy of real-time data streams includes heuristic means for classifying data events [25] and determining obfuscation levels of combined events [26] . These approaches achieve some similar goals as we have set out to achieve, but do not provide an efficient mechanism for controlling access to private information.
Pseudonymization has been used to enhance the privacy of e.g. cellular networks, where mobile terminals are identified using temporary identifiers. To address the location leakage threat, more frequent changes of these identifiers have been proposed e.g. by Kune et al. [27] . Our proposed mechanism is more optimal in the sense of overhead and security levels, as re-pseudonymization decisions can be made dynamically based on the environmental knowledge of the number of undistinguishable data sources. Our approach is also suitable for a one-to-many communication architecture.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Authentication and end-to-end identification of data sources in smart cities and districts is essential to enable the development of reliable and trustworthy analytic services, e.g., for energy efficiency. However, such solutions should not compromise residents' privacy by disclosing information for unauthorized parties. We presented an adaptive pseudonymization approach that anonymizes data streams from constantly changing real-time environments. The model enables low-cost and fine-grained access and privacy control over sensitive information. The model is appropriate for architectures where information is brokered in real-time using a publish-subscribe communication pattern.
The robustness of the privacy provided by the approach (i.e. the easiness of de-pseudonymization) depends on 1) the type of measured information, 2) the number of data sources producing similar information, 3) the amount of correlated information and events, as well as 4) the re-pseudonymization frequency. Based on these observations we have proposed an adaptation framework and algorithms for estimating the robustness of anonymity and for controlling the re-pseudonymization frequency, as well as the use of alternative secrecy mechanisms.
We have presented early evaluation results against energy measurements collected in the DoF project. These results are encouraging and provide the necessary foundation for the applicability of the approach in use cases where the number of similar data sources is sufficiently large. However, the data set and the number of data sources used for validation is rather small. Thus, more comprehensive validation needs to be performed as future work. Furthermore, we only evaluated the proposed approach from the privacy perspective. Aspects such as the performance impact on the brokering will need to be considered as well.
The presented pseudonymization model was evaluated against temporal correlation attacks with values from a single data source. An advanced attacker could utilize correlated data from various sources. In the future, statistical metrics should be defined and an evaluation performed to gain a better understanding of potential privacy attacks using such multidimensional correlation analyses.
Our analysis considers only energy information. In the future, the approach may be accommodated for and validated with different types of information sources. Other potential application cases are sharing of environmental monitoring data -where producers of weather and pollution information may want to protect their sensor investments -as well as traffic monitoring data -which may be misused e.g. to track individual users.
